salts

If the attacker can get the list of password hashes, what's stopping him from getting your salts too?

Presumably it's long, because you made your per-password salt ludicrously long, because you don't really understand how salts work.

This means that even with unique salts it is still fairly trivial to try a large number of passwords on a large number of users and crack many or them.

Is it in the form of dissolved CO2 that's with the salts dissolved?

The heat exchange medium can also be molten salts, which will retain a lot of thermal energy for the night, without using batteries.

And that's easilly and cheaply treated (50 US cents of oral rehydration salts).

The bcrypt algo already salts, there's no need to prepend extra stuff.

I certainly get why a slower hash would curb brute force attacks, but when I'm talking about unique salts, slowing down the hash is not the purpose I have in mind.

These salts are insoluble and are obtained through precipitation reactions.

If we converted (for example) 1% of the ocean to hydrogen, oxygen, salts, etc.

Bath salts also fall into that category, for example.

Lithium salts are most commonly prescribed in pill form.

"Salts" do nothing to slow this attack down, because they add insignificant time (really, none) to a single hash iteration.

This is exactly what happened with "Bath Salts".

> "Salts" have been password-specific since Ken Thompson invented them in the '70s.

"Salts" have been password-specific since Ken Thompson invented them in the '70s.

Salts are usually stored in two components; one is in the database and unique per row, to prevent cracking multiple rows at once.