crypto

I'd sort of hope they weren't using PHP's built-in crypto or any crypto library that deals in null-terminated strings.

The issue is that because Crypton does crypto with JavaScript in the web view of a Cordova app, it needs to not be stupendously slow.

You have probably never used a crypto tool that used either Dual_EC or extended-random, for what it's worth.

There doesn't appear to be much crypto in this project; it's a small application built on SpiderOak's Crypton.io.

It's still possible that white-box crypto can provide that level of assurance for some kinds of content.

That's not worrying at all as long as the crypto -- completely managed locally -- is strong.

Section 2 of this paper is a pretty good overview of white box crypto and the well-known attacks on it.

Extended-random was proposed as a way to allow DoD to deploy TLS on its networks, rather than using custom crypto protocols.

This is basically what 1Password does -- local crypto and stored on Dropbox or iCloud.

Now, if they're doing the crypto all local and syncing between devices with a miniature version of SpiderOak that would be OK.

I guess I'm jaded from all the other crypto-currency and I just can't get excited about this.

Worth mentioning: a big application for white-box crypto is DRM and content protection.

Trying to build a smart contract with any kind of "real world" dependency like this seems equivalent to using a crypto system with an extra key that the government controls, there's a single point of failure that could compromise the whole system.

The achilles heel of a network such as ethereum (and bitcoin) is that "the crypto-economy" needs to stay causally disconnected from the other economy, that uses blockchains as a tool to run trusted fiduciary code (currency, insurance, identity, reputation).

I really wish people wouldn't base their claims on security contests like this: "nobody has claimed the reward so it must be secure" is fundamentally a really bad argument, and - as Moxie's article on the Telegram crypto contest [1] demonstrates - it's easy to design constraints that look reasonable but in fact make the contest unwinnable, regardless of the scheme's security.

If it's "the randomness in a crypto transport had to be of arbitrary length, contributed both by client and server, and tied to keying" then it's just a somehow rephrased "the public randomness for each side should be at least twice as long as the security level" which I (and the article authors before) also quoted as a DoD excuse.

I'm not a fan of Crypton, but it's not clownshoes crypto.

> I'm not a fan of Crypton Just curious - is this to do with using javascript crypto[0]?