phish

Sometimes you get the phishing page from /, or a redirection from hxxp://phish/ to hxxp://phish/the/actual/path but most of the time, knowing the actual path is needed.

If the spear phish contained a zero-day OS exploit (previously unknown vulnerability), that would be pretty darn sophisticated.

Key is that you don't need to phish, you can just wait until the user downloads an unencrypted executable.

So if MS is willing to help phish users, they'll probably let a dice game slide by.

It would be pretty hilarious to read an incident report six months from now that cited that link as a successful phish.

There just aren't enough unemployed Phish fans to account for all of it.

That to me would be a targeted attack rather than some random phish.

With http I can phish you, and anybody else can read or alter that phishing attempt.

I have no knowledge of the particulars of Gemalto--just speaking generally about how a spear phish attempt might be evaluated.

Like Chrome not letting you bind to half of the Emacs shortcuts because some evil actor could use them on a webpage to phish you.

I'm not sure what to think about this behavior and generally with link shortener, it's an easy way to phish people in forum, comments,...

With self-signed certificates, I can phish you, and you know that my phishing attempt was neither altered in transit nor read by anyone else.

The documentation's FAQ page asks: "How much phish could a cuttlephish phish if a cuttlephish could phish phish?" This is not accurate based on my own testing.

The term "phish" is deeply offensive to cuttlephish, who are proud cephalopods.

Not all parts of a cymbal "phish" is equally loud, so setting it all to max will distort the sound (sacrifice dynamic range), but will consumers really care?

It's funny, the first thing that came to mind here was "this guy sounds like he's trying to phish his way onto somebody else's VM", but alas, it wasn't that interesting.