phenomenological

The linked research only describes phenomenological characteristics of illusions, so it doesn't strike me as an explanation.

It's possible that the heart is the phenomenological seat of mind for some -- either innately or culturally -- irrespective of objective anatomy.

The idea that either, as a phenomenological consequence of human interaction, has a simple solution is technically possible but foolhardy.

As always, any epistemic framework (all the way through to physics) must cohere with the phenomenological departure of [things like] us, humans.

A kind of phenomenological argument, which doesn't really stick with me, fwiw.

Then there is a phenomenological mathematical model of a two terminal device.

But understanding and awareness and phenomenological experiences are not there.

I'm interested in it from a purely philosophical / phenomenological point of view.

Perhaps it's phenomenological models all the way down.

Consciousness is the phenomenological space of experience.

It is also much easier to learn the jargon and read some of the softer phenomenological articles than to develop a sound understanding of the underlying mathematics and physics.

Moreover capital itself has no agency (it doesn't need to do anything, compared to say electrons) and any model that describes the flow of capital doesn't have the same standing as say Maxwells equations, they aren't even phenomenological.

They refer to their model as "single-compartment phenomenological spiking neurons, learning synapses with spike-timing dependent plasticity, and axonal delays" in their The cat is out of the bag article.

Maybe I'm mis-understanding your point but the issue isn't just about "phenomenological reality".

Being a programmer has phenomenological consequences--you can determine who is or isn't a programmer using games or tests which don't have anything to do with programming trivia, and without mentioning that "potential for ability to program" is what you're testing for.

There is no phenomenological consequence of being a "Scotsman"; therefore, its properties can be assigned arbitrarily, based on first assigning someone to the set (by marriage, say), and then remarking on the thing all the members of the new, expanded set have in common.