interiority

None of that points to any sort of interiority, and that is the category error you’re making.

The confusion regarding the neglected interiority was a conscious decision by the mainstream in the beginning was it not?

So calling the LLM 'empty' because it lacks interiority prior to language is importing exactly the humanist subject Lacan was trying to dissolve.

I assume that other humans have this same kind of interiority as me, because they are humans like me.

The other path of human development, the spiritual one, begins with the conception that something else happens in the interiority of a human.

I wonder if this lack of interiority is a common trait amongst the most economically successful.

I’m pretty sure most of the people you are talking about aren’t confident that, in the scenarios they describe, that the computer would have any kind of interiority.

I believe most of them believe that it is in principle possible for a program to have interiority (if doing e.g.

None of this requires the ML model to have any interiority.

They have nowhere for an interiority or mind to live.

In fact, not even all humans have that kind of interiority, and it’s not necessarily a must have for being functional at a variety of tasks.

I am assuming that the LLM has no interiority (which is similar to the conclusion that the Chinese Room argument argues for).

But bodies which refuse to harbor an "interiority" are fast-tracked to destruction because they can't suf^W^W^W be productive.

Ask him about the “hermetic order”(that is either emergent, convergent or by design?)one discovers in interiority studies of GPT.

But if there is an "interiority" for LLMs, it must be very very different to humans.

That means the LLM builds an internal state even while processing a prompt, and that state is what guides its eventual output- a kind of “interiority.” The claim is that this answerer-model is the interiority we’re talking about when we ask if LLMs have anything like consciousness.