priv

So are you encrypting the RSA priv key with the fingerprint or just checking the fingerprint before using the key?

Similarly, it looks like the shared keys are derived from subslices of k_(pub,x) and k_(priv,3-x).

Flash runs in a low-priv environment is nearly every major browser, includes application-specific exploit mitigations, and it silently auto-updates, just like Chrome.

Also later you reference k_(peer,1) and k_(priv,1) which weren't mentioned previously at any point.

The reason for the 404 is because by default no action is bound to / in the proplists for the priv/<appname>.routes file.

OpenBSD has many examples of priv-sep such as openssh, just using seperate processes.

It would be nice to have a totally free software tablet, and use a USB OTG baseband to priv seg it from the device.

Good tip on the pub/priv key auth for ssh.

Capsicum in FreeBSD is much more usable, and they are starting to priv-sep programs with it, they are good examples, I would look at them.

While we love more people testing the system/priv-app and root support in FDroid, keep in mind it is very very beta and not ready for general use.

The best defense is not storing anything which is not already public on the server, and a single-click restore feature which should be used liberally anytime a priv-escalating exploit is patched.

A correctly done client cert provides mutual authentication (the server's ssl cert and priv key it had when you signed up with it is the one needed to sign in in the future).

I have no idea what `pexp="smtpd: \[priv\]"` does), so using a completely declarative language with a trivial syntax doesn't seem a huge issue either.

Priv separation is a good idea even if you trust your parser.