Epistemological used in a sentence

Epistemological in a sentence as an adjective

I suppose it's possible I'm wrong, but we get into all sorts of epistemological questions there.

The main problem with "climate science" is epistemological. It does not hold up to the foundational standards of the natural science which rely on falsification.

Do people live their lives and engage in conversations in a way that indicates they understand the epistemological stance of scientists? I have a super power in this regard.

The HN I read is full of anti-epistemological conspiracy theorists these days.

Besides blanket epistemological statements, how about we also do a little thinking on individual cases and how it applies to them?

That's an epistemological conclusion, not a political one.

To me, that's a huge epistemological limitation, and I think it will hamper your ability to grow intellectually. I have found that with certain things I had to first accept them and live with them, after someone I trust and respect, with different experience than I have, suggested they were true.

"Our society as a whole doesn't have the epistemological foundation needed for the level of technical sophistication it has." Thank you sir for reminding me why I am quitting my job to begin a Master's degree in Technology and Public Policy.

Do you think this attitude explains some of the epistemological issues behind the anti-vaccine movement? I'm pro-vaccination, but I find it weird when people mock others for not believing vaccines are safe and then go on to criticize GMOs and the validity of nutritional studies.

Depending on your particular ontological and epistemological leanings, that question and the question of free will may be the same, or conflating the two may be a category error. I personally fall in the latter camp, but this was an interesting foray into the musings of a brilliant mind.

Instead I read a link to a TED talk, epistemological meta-babble, and a promise that further experiments are incoming. This company may be completely legitimate and its product may be the most revolutionary thing since sliced bread, but I didn't know before I read this post, I don't know now, and I now think their CTO sounds too Steorn-y for comfort.

I think the closest we can get is heuristics for identifying whether or not something is being actively deceptive, but it's a big epistemological leap to say that we can definitely determine truth in an algorithmic way. Google is very good in these situations, but Google has a hard time differentiating between a popular movement and a single determined astroturfer.

However, Marxism is just an abstraction that is related to the underlying epistemological disease of the modern era which is that we use statistics to prove our assumptions regardless of an actual identified mechanism of the phenomenon. We discard the search for the theory because it's hard and we've become accustomed to believing hand-wavy explanations for fields or social phenomenon we are not experts in.

Do you really need to try to make the overheated claim that being waffly with facts and simplistic with the human narrative is the result of an academia-enforced political and epistemological philosophy? Mr. Khan isn't exactly saying, you know, 'As we learn from a cursory reading of Baudrillard, the concept that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in any meaningful, substantial way is clearly a fiction of the necessities of realpolitik.'

That you cannot conclusively prove a particular proposition is true is an epistemological/methodological issue which is not incompatible with the existence of external reality, or the idea that the purpose of our methodologies is to more accurately model said external reality. And yes, one way we do that is by incrementally pruning theories; and another way we do it is by replacing entire theories.

And since science, logic, and knowledge are fundamentally based on these concepts in terms of looking for what to talk about and measure, I think this may be a serious epistemological problem that leaves humans capped at a certain level in terms of what we can know. This is also why I'm generally skeptical of sites like Less Wrong, as I think the real limits of rationality and human knowledge have almost nothing to do with the 'official' list of logical fallacies that these sites tend to focus on.

I think you have to start with the fact that while AQ was at full force and relatively untargetted by the US it took them 8 years between attacks on the World Trade Center, there is just no epistemological model which gives you any way to measure effectiveness once we are already at war in Afghanistan. Additionally you have a problem of us saying that we have to fight them over there so they can't fight us over here, but that has a side effect of ensuring that they don't have to come over here to fight us.

A thin metaphysical/epistemological distinction to be sure, but one that is relevant because when we need to trust our senses, we need to know our sensor limits, and when we need to trust remote sensors, extra-terrestrial remoteness is as remote as it gets, and its hard limits cannot be easily overcome once deployed.

While it is easy to understand and agree with this on the epistemological level, the answer that I and many others would give is that we expect a physical theory to do more than merely predict experimental results in the manner of an empirical equation; we want to come down to Einstein's ontological level and understand what is happening when an atom emits light, when a spin enters a Stern-Gerlach magnet, etc. The Copenhagen theory, having no answer to any question of the form: "What is really happening when - - - ?"