sshd

That is so many orders of magnitude faster than asking an sshd if the password is correct, even with the flaw discussed here where it isn't rate limited.

> In a few years we've gone from /etc/init.d/sshd restart to service sshd restart to systemctl start sshd.

If the machines are on a public network you ssh to another person's sshd, then use terminal chat programs.

Each OpenVZ container has everything (init, sshd, syslogd etc.) except the kernel (which is shared).

Programs shouldn't parse it for precisely the same reason why Firefox doesn't parse sshd's arguments.

Just one non trivial example: I can secure Ubuntu against sshd attacks pretty good and easy with `sudo apt-get install fail2ban`.

Key takeaway: > And as several correspondents have reminded me already -- switching your sshd to keys only authentication will let you sleep better at night.

Now try to secure CoreOS against sshd attacks.

I believe capsicum is/will be used for sandboxing sshd, ping and tcpdump.

I have disabled PAM by default on all my boxes that run sshd for the last 9 years out of habit, I long ago forgot the reason why (probably because the gentoo sshd handbook entry said it was a good idea).

If you do this, keep it in the privileged range (< 1024) or you run the risk of your ssh server crashing and some malicious normal user binds to your unprivileged port with a fake sshd and grabs your root password.

You might say "but they might make it impossible to login and do that", but they could have done the same under Linux just by not running sshd - however they didn't.

SSH access would be more like "heroku run bash" where you don't log into an existing instance, you log into a fresh ephemeral instance that just runs sshd and gets destroyed on logout.