refuter

If the refuter thought the argument was weak, they could have simply responded with their point of view and some evidence, rather than complaining. It's not like the OP was making claims on hidden truths.

While I'm here, another problem with things like this is the tendency for people to use them as an argument-refuter-o-matic. Indicating an argument is fallacious is not a rebuttal of the argument: it's merely an indicator that the argument is incomplete.

Anyway, Girard begins with Lorenzen's idea that a proof can be understood as a dialogue between a proponent and a refuter, and the observation that the continuation-passing-style translation embedding classical logic into intuitionistic logic doesn't require that the answer type of the continuation be the empty type. He observes that these two ideas fit together in Krivine-style realizability models of classical logic: every formula can be interpreted as a set of proofs and refutations, and the interaction of a proof with a refutation yields a behaviour in the answer type.